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I.

INTRODUCTION

Something significant happened in anti-bribery enforcement in 2013. A bribery investigation
began into one of the world’s largest pharmaceutical companies. “Four Glaxo China Executives
Held in Criminal Probe,” 1 read an article in a major news outlet. Reports of the Glaxo Smith
Kline (GSK) investigation2 were followed with announcements that the life sciences industry
would be subject to enhanced scrutiny.3 UCB announced that it was being investigated.

4

Authorities visited the local offices of Bayer,5 Novartis, AstraZeneca, Eli Lilly, and Sanofi.6 At
the same time, the government was engaging in a broader crackdown on bribery in the public
sector with high profile trials.7
These events rattled international businesses with operations in China—a group already
accustomed to bribery investigations. Corruption inquiries have become common in the life
science industry8 and China is notorious for its corruption. 9 But even for this seasoned

1 Four Glaxo China Executives Held in Criminal Probe, BLOOMBERG NEWS (July 15, 2013),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-07-15/glaxo-case-part-of-wider-china-probe-on-drugs-market -dailysays.html.
2 The Chinese government accused GSK of paying USD 490 millio n in bribes to doctors and government
officials. The bribes were apparently funneled through inflated travel-agency expenses. Id.
3 Michael Martina, More foreign pharmaceutical firms could be probed in China: Xinhua , REUT ERS (July 24,
2013) http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/07/24/us-china-pharmaceutical-idUSBRE96N0EA20130724.
4 Ben Deighton and Ben Hirschler, China widens drug industry probe, visits Belgium’s UCB, REUT ERS (July 19,
2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/ 07/ 19/us -gsk-china-ucb-idUSBRE96H0XQ20130719.
5 Chinese Authorities Probing German Drugmaker Bayer, REUT ERS UK EDIT ION (Sept. 13, 2013),
http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/09/13/us -bayer-china-idUKBRE98C06Y20130913.
6 Andrew Jack and Patti Walmeir, Eli Lilly drawn into pharmaceutical corruption claims in China, FINANCIAL
TIMES (Aug. 22, 2013), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/d011b670-0b11-11e3-bffc-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2zoZZJZ4t
7 See e.g., Bo Xilai scandal: Timeline, BBC NEWS CHINA (Nov. 11, 2013), http://www.bbc.com/news/worldasia-china-17673505.
8 For an explanation of why life science companies are targeted frequently, see Lanny A. Breuer, Assistant
Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Prepared Keynote Address to the Tenth Annual Pharmaceutical Regulatory
and Compliance Congress and Best Practices Forum (Nov. 12, 2009), www.ehcca.com/presentations/pharma
congress10/breuer_2.pdf , (“nearly every aspect of the approval, manufacture, import, export, pricing, sale, and
marketing of a drug product in a foreign country will involve a ‘foreign official’”…under the FCPA.”).
9 See, e.g., David Voreacos, China’s Bribery Culture Poses Risks for Multinationals, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Nov.
21, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-11-21/china-s-bribery-culture-poses-risks-for-
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community, the news was startling because the reports resulted, not from a U.S. Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act10 (FCPA) investigation, but rather, from a Chinese investigation of Chinese
domestic anti-bribery laws.
For the most part, China’s domestic anti-bribery laws are not new.11 China’s Criminal Law
has addressed bribery since 1979.12 Administrative law, through the Anti-Unfair Competition
Law (AUCL), has prohibited bribery since 1993.13 Still these laws have failed to shape the way
companies operate in China. Enforcement was nearly non-existent. When the Chinese
government did target bribery, it tended to focus on the officials receiving bribes, letting sources
of bribes and non-government recipients off the hook.14 Companies referred to the Chinese laws
as “local laws,”15 a politically correct way of paying lip service to domestic laws in countries
with high corruption levels and weak or unenforced bribery laws.
The FCPA, meanwhile, has driven international corporations to adopt policies, procedures,
training, due diligence, auditing, and other controls intended to battle bribery in operations all
multinationals.html; see also, Didi Kirsten Tatlow, An Investor’s Guide to Buying Influence in China, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 14, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/25/world/asia/25iht-letter25.ht ml.
10 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (1977) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 et seq.) [hereinafter FCPA].
11 2011 amendment to Article 164 of the Criminal Law, prohibiting Chinese individuals or entities from bribing
foreign government officials or officials of public international organizations. Criminal Law of the People’s
Republic of China (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., July 6, 1979, effective Jan. 1, 1980)
art. 164 (amended 2011), , translated in WEI LUO, THE AMENDED AND ANNOTATED CRIMINAL CODE OF
THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA WITH OFFICIAL INTERPRETATIONS (Wei Luo trans., 2d ed. 2012)
[hereinafter PRC Criminal Law].
12 See PRC Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l
People’s Cong., July 6, 1979 effective Jan. 1, 1980), art. 383-95, art. 163, and art. 164.
13 See Anti-Unfair Competition Law (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong. Sept. 2, 1993,
effective Dec. 1, 1993) art. 8., http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?lib=law&id=648&CGid =.
http://en.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=3306.
14 Daniel C.K. Chow, China’s Crackdown on Commercial Bribery, Corruption in State-Owned Enterprises, and
the Impact on U.S.-based Multinational Companies Doing Business in China , Testimony during CongressionalExecutive Commission on China roundtable on Corruption in China Today: Consequences for Governance, Human
Rights, and Commercial Rule of Law (Nov. 21, 2013),
http://www.cecc.gov/sites/chinacommission.house.gov/files/CECC%20Roundtable%20%20Corruption%20in%20Ch ina%20-%20Daniel%20Chow%20Written%20Statement.pdf.
15 See, e.g., Legal and ethical risks of healthcare businesses in China ,
http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g =2a174345-49ed-4885-ae07-7b fd797796d 3.
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over the world.16 Since 2004, the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) have engaged in dramatic FCPA enforcement efforts.17 In 2013 alone,
companies paid fines totaling over USD 720 million and twelve individuals were charged. 18 The
corporate fines in 2013 averaged USD 80 million per corporation. 19 Its significant extraterritorial
reach has made the FCPA a concern of any business with a whisper of a connection to the U.S.20
On one hand the FCPA has served to raise the profile of bribery as a worldwide problem. On
the other hand, the relative dominance of the FCPA has meant that companies have not spent
much time ensuring compliance with other bribery laws.
Most countries now have some form of law against bribery. Some are broader than the
FCPA. The most prominent other national law has been the UK Bribery Act21 (Bribery Act).
Because it is the strictest law on paper, it garnered a lot of attention when it passed in 2010.22

16

See, e.g., Report to Congress by the Comptroller General: Impact of Foreign Corrupt Pract ices act on U.S.
Business, U.S. General Accounting Office 10- 12 (March 4, 1981), http://www.gao.gov/assets/140/132199.pdf
(discussing early impacts of the FCPA), see also, Best Practices for Managing Compliance in China, US-CHINA
BUSINESS COUNCIL 3 (Oct. 2013) ,
http://www.uschina.org/sites/default/files/USCBC%20Co mpliance%20Report%202013.pdf , (reporting that all of
the thirty companies interviewed agreed that the FCPA is the “guiding document for establishing clear company
guidelines when conducting international business.”); see also, Non-compliance with U.S. Anticorruption Law: Are
you losing millions in company value? A SIAN-M ENA COUNSEL , Vol. 10, Iss. 1, 2012,
http://www.duanemorris.com/articles/static/wolfe_gehring_asiamena_0512.pdf (discussing the way that FCPA
compliance or lack thereof could affect the value of Asian companies).
17 See SHEARMAN & ST ERLING LLP, FCPA DIGEST : CASES AND REVIEW RELEASES RELAT ING TO BRIBES OF
FOREIGN OFFICIALS UNDER THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACT ICES A CT OF 1977 ( Jan. 2014),
http://www.shearman.com/~/media/Files/Services/FCPA/2014/January_ 2014_FCPA_DigestFCPA010614.pdf .
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 For a critical discussion of the extraterritorial reach of the FCPA, see Sean Hecker and Margot Laporte,
Should FCPA “Territorial” Jurisdiction Reach Extraterritorial Proportions?, ABA INT ERNATIONAL LAW NEWS,
Vol. 42, No.1 (Winter 2013),
http://www.americanbar.org/publications/international_law_ news/2013/winter/should_fcpa_territorial_jurisdiction_r
each_extraterritorial_proportions.html.
21 Bribery Act 2010, c. 23 (U.K.), http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2010/23/contents , [hereinafter
BRIBERY ACT].
22 For more on the early buzz around the Bribery Act, see e.g, Richard Wachman and Larry Elliott, Serious
Fraud Office Promises Crackdown on Firms Offering Bribes Abroad , THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 10, 2010),
http://www.theguardian.com/law/2010/oct/10/serious -fraud-office-bribery-crackdown.
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Lack of enforcement23 though, has meant that the fledgling law that has yet to significantly
impact corporate behavior. No other laws have had the teeth or the enforcement drive to capture
the corporate attention, so the FCPA has remained the dominant anti-bribery law.
That focus on the FCPA does not mean that companies are unaware of Chinese corruption
risks. In fact, most executives are keenly aware that Chinese operations pose FCPA bribery
dangers.

24

Chinese operations have proved problematic under the FCPA. China has been the

scene of more violations than any other country, save Nigeria. 25 Companies doing business in
China have been under enhanced scrutiny relating to bribery for years.26 Avon has been under
investigation since 2011 for bribery in China. 27 Pfizer, IBM, Morgan Stanley, and JPMorgan
Chase are among the many other companies that have faced highly-publicized FCPA inquiries
stemming from conduct in China.28

23 For more on the Bribery Act’s early enforcement or lack thereof, as well as predictions on its future, see Neil
Baker, U.K.’s Bribery Act Fails to Deliver Significant Cases, COMPLIANCE W EEK (Feb. 20, 2013),
http://www.complianceweek.com/uks -bribery-act-fails-to-deliver-significant-cases/article/280865/; see also, Kevin
Roberts, Jarod G.Taylor, & Duncan Grieve, UK Bribery Act Comes to Life, Morrison & Foerster Client Alert (Aug.
15, 2013) http://www.dwt.com/Chinese-Probe-Into-GSKMedia -Reports-and-Legal-Analysis-07-29-2013/#_ftn7:
http://www.mofo.com/files/Uploads/Images/130815-UK-Bribery-Act.pdf, (The Bribery Act contains some of the
strictest laws against corruption, but enforcement has been minimal since the act was passed in 2010. No cases have
been brought against international actors so far. Although guidance revisions have indicated a tougher stance
towards enforcement, the few cases brought against corporate entities ultimately involved charges under previous
laws. Still, the SFO has indicated that a number of cases are currently being investigated, and may lead to
prosecutions in the future.”).
24 For more information on the China-related FCPA concerns, see generally Daniel Chow, China Under the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 2012 Wis. L. Rev. 573-607, http://wisconsinlawreview.org/wp-content/files/12Chow.pdf.
25 Voreacos, supra at note 9.
26 See, e.g. Michael Li-Ming Wong, Emily A. Proskine, and Brent E. Jones, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
and Pharma in the Chinese Market, CPB Review, Gibson Dunn Vol. 21 (2010),
http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications /Documents/Li-MingWongJones-FCPAandPharmainChineseMarket.pdf.
27 Julie DiMauro, Avon sets aside millions more for FCPA Settlement, FCPA BLOG (Feb. 14, 2914, 3:18 AM),
http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2014/2/14/avon-sets-aside-millions-more-for-fcpa-settlement.html#.
28 Voreacos, supra at note 9.
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If that was not enough, companies often look to Transparency International (TI),29 for
information about a country’s corruption risk. TI gives China a Corruption Perceptions Index
score of 40 out of 100 with 100 being “very clean” and zero being “highly corrupt.”30 Under
their assessment, China is the 80th worst for corruption perceptions out of 177 countries included
in the survey.31 In response to the 2012 survey placing China in the same position, Chinese
citizens posted comments on the internet joking that the Chinese government must have bribed
TI in order to achieve such a moderately bad ranking.32 TI also publishes a Bribe Payers Index,
ranking 28 of the world’s largest economies according to the perceived likelihood that
companies from these countries will pay bribes abroad. China is second only Russia in that
ranking.33
Various aspects of China’s political, economic, and cultural environment contribute to
systemic risk of venality. If power corrupts, China, dominated by one party rule for over sixty
years, is ripe for corruption. The Chinese government controls not only the political system, but
also the economy, and many of its most important industries. 34 As a result, there is frequent
interaction between the government and companies.

29

See e.g., Joel Schectman, Transparency International Rankings Still FCPA Workhorse, Wall Street Journal
(Apr. 22, 2014), http://blogs.wsj.com/riskandcompliance/2014/04/22/transparency-international-rankings-still-fcpaworkhorse/, (referring to Dow Jones Risk & Compliance survey showing, “ decades -old Transparency International
Rankings continue to be a leading data source for companies looking to shore up c ompliance controls in emerging
markets.”).
30 For reference, Singapore received an 86, the U.S. received a 73, and Brazil received a 42, Corruption
Perception Index 2013, TRANSPARENCY INT ’L, http://cpi.transparency.org/cpi2013/results/#myAnchor1.
31 Corruption Perception Index 2013, TRANSPARENCY INT ’L ,
http://www.transparency.org/country#CHN_DataResearch .
32 David Caragliano, Is China Really the 80th-Most-Corrupt Country on Earth?, THE A T LANTIC (Dec. 12,
2012), http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/12/ is -china-really-the-80th-most-corrupt-country-onearth/266172/.
33 For reference, companies from the Netherlands and Switzerland are seen as least likely to bribe,
http://www.transparency.org/country#CHN_DataResearch.
34 For an overview of the relationship between the Chinese government and industry, see Capitalism confined,
ECONOMIST (Sept. 3, 2011), http://www.economist.com/node/21528262.
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Each interaction creates an opportunity for a corrupt official to request or accept bribes. The
potential for corruption is especially high in highly-regulated fields like life sciences, energy, and
communications, where interaction with the government is common. In addition, the complicated
Chinese regulatory structure has meant that corporations must rely on third parties to navigate
the regulatory environment and to interact with the government on their behalf. The high bribery
risk posed by third parties is underscored by the fact that ninety percent of FCPA cases involve
conduct by third parties.35
To make matters more worse, individuals working in many state-owned or state-controlled
industries receive paltry sums for their work leading to the expectation that they will supplement
their income.36 Finally, cultural norms around cultivating personal relationships, giving gifts, and
providing hospitality have made bribery a ubiquitous part of life in China. 37 One author even
published Chinese Guanxi, described as an “advice book that teaches people how to cultivate
social connections with dinners, expensive gifts and “red packets,” or cash-filled envelopes.”38 It
is no shock then that Chinese business operations pose a risk of bribery.
But while companies are keenly aware of FCPA-related bribery risks in China, they remain
largely oblivious to Chinese bribery laws. Chinese laws have not played a meaningful role in
corporate policies, procedures, or crisis plans. If China’s bribery laws do come up, the discussion

35

See Stephen Clayton, Top Ten Basic of Feign Corrupt Practices Act Compliance for the Small Legal
Department, Association of Corporate Counsel, http://www.acc.com/legalresources/publications/topten/SLD-FCPACompliance.cfm.
36 See, e.g., Kazunori Takada, Bribery serves as life-support for Chinese hospitals, REUT ERS (July 23, 2013),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/07/ 23/us -china-hospitals-bribery-idUSBRE96M 12Y20130723
37 Voreacos, supra note 9.
38 Didi Kirsten Tatlow, An Investor’s Guide to Buying Influence in China, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 14, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/25/wo rld/asia/25iht-letter25.ht ml.
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often turns to the potential for triggering or impacting a parallel FCPA investigation39 or other
carbon-copy inquiry.40 It is true that Chinese investigations can alert the DOJ to FCPA
violations,41 but FCPA investigations are not the only risk.
Myopic focus on the FCPA and even the potential of the Bribery Act can lead to compliance
gaps in China that leave international companies and their employees in jeopardy. In the wake of
the GSK bribery scandal, a growing number of international companies are recognizing this
reality. In a 2013 survey conducted by the American Chamber of Commerce in Shanghai, nearly
half of the 399 respondents claimed that compliance with local Chinese law is more important
than compliance with the FCPA or the Bribery Act. 42 The number of firms with that opinion had
doubled since 2012.43 That is a sea change in attitude toward “local Chinese law.” And while it
might be a stretch to say that compliance with Chinese laws is more important than compliance
with the FCPA, it is certainly crucial. The GSK investigation and its aftermath should provide a
much-needed wake-up call for foreign companies with operations in China who remain focused
exclusively on FCPA-based concerns. It is a good time then, to take stock of Chinese bribery
laws and their implications for international companies.

See e.g., Daniel Chow, The Interplay Between China’s Anti-Bribery Laws and the Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act, 73:5 OH. ST . L. J. 1015, 1019 (2013),
http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/students/groups/oslj/files/2013/02/73.5.Chow_.pdf , (arguing that MNCs should view
Chinese commercial bribery cases with gravity because they can trigger parallel FCPA action); See also, Daniel
C.K. Chow, China’s Crackdown on Commercial Bribery, Corruption in State-Owned Enterprises, and the Impact
on U.S.-based Multinational Companies Doing Business in Chin a, Oral testimony, November 21, 2013.
http://www.cecc.gov/sites/chinacommission.house.gov/files/CECC%20Roundtable%20%20Corruption%20in%20Ch ina%20-%20Daniel%20Chow%20Written%20Statement.pdf, (concluding that the
“highest risk is not prosecution under China’s anti-bribery laws for commercial bribery but prosecutions under the
FCPA, which has much stiffer monetary penalties and also the possibility of imprisonment for U.S. executives
involved directly or indirectly in the giving of the bribe.”)
40 See generally, Andrew S. Boutros and T. Markus Funk, “Carbon Copy” Prosecutions: A Growing
Anticorruption Phenomenon in a Shrinking World , originally published in U. Chi. Legal F. 2012, at 259,
http://www.perkinscoie.com/files/upload/12_10_Boutros_Funk_Final.pdf.
41 Chow, supra note 39.
42 The American Chamber of Commerce in Shanghai China Business Report 19, 2013-2014,
http://www.amcham-shanghai.org/ftpuploadfiles/Website/CBR/2013-2014-China-Business-Report.pdf
43 Id.
39
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This paper seeks to underscore why and how Chinese laws should factor more prominently
into corporate policies and planning. Part II addresses the “why”—why Chinese laws should
matter to international companies. Chinese laws are broader in some respects than the FCPA.
Dual compliance with the FCPA due diligence requirements and Chinese laws might be
problematic. The consequences of violating Chinese laws can be steep. Also, enforcement
against international companies will likely continue. Part III speaks to the “how”—how
international companies should be altering their policies and procedures to account for Chinese
laws. This paper then offers modest prescriptions for how to prevent non-compliance with
Chinese laws as well as how to prepare for allegations of bribery.
II.

WHY COMPANIES SHOULD BE CONCERNED WITH CHINESE LAWS

There are multiple reasons why foreign companies should be devoting more attention to
Chinese laws. Section A explains that Chinese anti-bribery laws are broader in some respects
than the FCPA, creating a potential compliance gap. Section B alerts companies to the possibility
that their FCPA “best practices” conflict with Chinese laws on collecting information. Section C
underscores the fact that the consequences for breaking Chinese bribery laws, or even appearing
to, can be weighty. Section D argues that continued enforcement against international companies
is likely.
A. Chinese Anti-bribery Laws Are Broader in Some Respects than the FCPA
Corporations must realize that compliance with the FCPA will not ensure compliance with
Chinese laws. Some Chinese bribery laws do focus on official bribery meaning that they overlap
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with the FCPA.44 But China’s other anti-bribery laws are broader than the FCPA.45 Whereas the
FCPA only targets bribery of foreign officials, Chinese laws proscribe commercial bribery as
well.46 Additionally, while the FCPA has an exception for “facilitation payments,”47 Chinese law
does not contain such an exception.
1. Chinese Laws Proscribe Commercial Bribery
Many companies are accustomed to thinking about bribery, but they are usually worried
about the type of bribery that would violate the FCPA—bribery of a government official.48 And
while bribery of a government official is illegal China, so is commercial bribery, where the party
receiving the bribe is a private individual or entity.49 Thus, if a supplier pays a kickback to a
private company manager in return for a lucrative contract, it can violate Chinese law even if
there are no government personnel involved in the transaction. Or, if the sales group of a foreign
corporation pays for a lavish trip for employees of a private company in exchange for those
employees purchasing from them, it would violate Chinese laws, but not the FCPA. Or, if, as in
GSK’s case, executives receive financial and sexual kickbacks from third party, nongovernment, intermediaries, it would violate Chinese laws on commercial bribery. 50 Thus, even

44 Laws that generally overlap with the FCPA include art. 389, 390, and 393 (prohibiting giving bribes to PRC
officials), art. 391(prohibiting giving bribers to government organs and state-owned entities), art. 392 (prohibiting
the facilitation of bribes), and the 2011 amendment to art. 164 (prohibiting Chinese individuals or entities from
bribing foreign government officials or officials of public international organizations).
45 See Appendix A.
46 Defined as bribery where the party receiving the bribe is a private individual or entity.
47 FCPA 15 U.S.C. §78dd(B) .
48 Because the U.S. has taken an expansive view of “government official,” some “commercial bribery” under
Chinese laws would still be considered official bribery under the FCPA. Still, the FCPA certainly does not apply to
purely private actors or entities and it does not address recipients of bribes.
49 PRC Criminal Law, Article 163 and 164
50 See, e.g., Emily Ford, Leo Lewis, & James Dean, Glaxo’s travel agents organized bribes and prostitutes, say
police, THE TIMES (July 16, 2013), http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/business/industries/health/article3816774.ece.
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companies that are in full compliance with the FCPA may be non-compliant with Chinese
laws.51
While most company policies technically prohibit all forms of bribery, corporate procedures
and controls are meant to prevent and detect official bribery. For example, heightened due
diligence requirements are reserved for parties who will be interacting with government officials.
Also, auditors do not scrutinize records of interactions with private entities. They do not look for
employees’ kickbacks. As a result, companies face a risk that employees will violate Chinese
laws around commercial bribery.
It is important to note that Chinese law is not alone in prohibiting commercial bribery. In
fact, banning commercial bribery appears to be part of a larger trend. A 2003 European Union
Council Framework Decision orders all European Union states to proscribe commercial
bribery.52 The United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) signatories must
“consider” the criminalization of commercial bribery. 53 As discussed, the Bribery Act notably
forbids engaging in commercial bribery.54 Companies stringently complying with the Bribery
Act would probably be complying with Chinese laws relating to commercial bribery, but the
Bribery Act has not been very effective yet.

51

See Appendix A
A summary of the act is available at Europa Summaries of EU Legislation, 2003/568/JHA,
shttp://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/fight_against_fraud/fight_against_corruption/l33308_en.htm
53 United Nations Convention Against Corruption, Background of the United Nations Convention against
Corruption, http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/.
54 Wachman and Larry Elliott, Serious Fraud Office Promises Crackdown on Firms Offering Bribes Abro ad,
THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 10, 2010), http://www.theguardian.com/law/2010/oct/10/serious -fraud-office -bribery crackdown.
52
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Some U.S. state laws actually prohibit commercial bribery. Such laws can be “federalized”

55

under the U.S. Travel Act (Travel Act).56 For instance, Control Components, a U.S. company
was charged under the Travel Act for payments to private entities in addition to being charged
under the FCPA for illegal payments to foreign government officials.57 Still, generally,
commercial bribery has received limited attention in the corporate world.58 Without
enforcement, companies have not had enough incentive to radically alter their company
procedures.
If companies need another incentive to tackle commercial bribery though, they have it. Both
Chinese Criminal Law and administrative law prohibit commercial bribery. Criminal law
punishes the most serious or “relatively large”59 bribery cases. According to official guidelines,
“relatively large” involves bribes over RMB 10,000 for individual and RMB 200,000 for
entities.60 Article 163 of the Criminal Law addresses non-official bribe-takers;61 Article 164

55 See, e.g., Matthew Fowler, Beyond the FCPA: Commercial Bribery, the Travel Act, and Compliance, FCPA
Americas Blog (May 14, 2013) http://fcpamericas.com/english/anti-corruption-compliance/beyond-the-fcpacommercial-bribery-the-travel-act-and-co mpliance/; see also, H.L. Rogers and Ellen Chisham, In FCPA
Compliance, Don’t forget about the Travel Act, Law 360 (May 09, 2013),
http://www.law360.co m/articles/439533/in-fcpa-co mpliance-don-t-forget-about-the-travel-act
56 The Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (a).
57 The 2012 Resource Guide to the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act,
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/guide.pdf., [hereinafter DOJ Guidelines].
58 For one commentator discussing commercial bribery, see supra note 55.
59 Interpretations on Several Issues Concerning Application of Law for Handling Criminal Cases of Bribe
Offering (Promulgated by Sup. People’s Ct. & Sup. People’s Procuratorate, Dec. 31, 2012 effective Jan. 1, 2013)
art. 12 (China).
60 Id.
61 Article 163 of the PRC CRIMINAL LAW , supra n. 11, provides:

Whoever from the staff of a company or enterprise takes advantage of his office to extort or accept
illegally property from others and makes profits for others shall, if th e amount involved is
relatively huge, be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not more than five years or criminal
detention. If the amount involved is huge, the offender shall be sentenced to fixed -term
imprisonment of not less than five years, and may concurrently be sentenced to confiscation of
property.
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addresses non-official bribe-givers.62 Together, Article 163 and Article 164 make it unlawful to
offer to, or accept money or property from, the staff of a company or enterprise in return for
illegitimate benefits.63
Those found to be in violation of these provisions can be imprisoned, fined, or subject to
property confiscation. In 2010, four employees of Rio Tinto, an Australian company were
sentenced to prison for 7 to 14 years for taking bribes from Chinese steel mills.64 In 2008, eight
supervisors of the French supermarket chain, Carrefour, received jail sentences ranging from one
year to five years. The supervisors’ crime was taking kickbacks from suppliers in violation of
Article 163.65
Commercial Bribery is also addressed under administrative law. Article 8 of the AUCL
prohibits “business operators from paying bribes for the purpose of selling or purchasing foods

Whoever from the staff of a company or enterprise, in the course of economic activities, accepts
whatever kind of rebate or commission in violation of the state's stipulations, and takes poss ession
of it, shall be punished according to the provisions of the preceding paragraph.
62 Article 164 of the PRC CRIMINAL LAW , supra n. 11, reads, in relevant part:

Whoever offers property to the staff of a company or enterprise in order to make illegal profits
shall, if the amount involved is relatively huge, be sentenced to fixed -term imprisonment of not
more than three years or criminal detention. If the amount involved is huge, the offender shall be
sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not less than three years and not more than ten years, and
concurrently be sentenced to a fine.
If a unit commits a crime mentioned in the preceding paragraph, the unit shall be sentenced to a
fine, and persons directly in charge and other persons directly responsible for the crime shall be
punished according to the provisions of the preceding paragraph.

63
64

Id.
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Stephanie Wong, Carrefour Employees Jailed for Taking Bribes, China Daily Says. BLOOMBERG NEWS (July
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or services or obtaining other competitive advantages.”66 Offenses falling within the definition of
criminal law commercial bribery, but falling short of the criminal law threshold of RMB 10,000
per individual and RMB 100,000 for the entity could be prosecuted under this law. The
definition of commercial bribery under the AUCL is also broader than under criminal laws.
Under the AUCL, commercial bribery includes “offering other business parties property or using
other means to purchase or sell products in a manner that excludes competition.”67
Administrative fines, under the AUCL, range from RMB 10,000 to RMB 200,000. 68 Pepsi
Guangzhou was investigated in 2009 after the State Administration for Industry and Commerce
found that Pepsi had committed bribery in violation of the AUCL when it gave display fees to
stores. Pepsi paid approximately RMB 100,000, most of which was confiscated profit. The
judicial explanation referred to the language of the AUCL, saying that Pepsi had clearly engaged
in “bribery…in order to buy or sell products and services.”69

66 Article 8.1 and 8.2 of the AUCL:

Managers shall not use money or properties or the other methods to bribe to others in order to sell
or purchase commodities. It shall be guilty of giving bribe if managers give a secret commission to
the other organisations or individuals without the normal accounting records. It shall be guilty of
taking bribe, if the organisations or individuals accept the secret discount without normal
accounting records.
Managers may offer a discount to the others in public, or may pay commission to the middle man
in selling or purchasing commodities. However, managers who give discount to the others or pay
commission to the middle man, or the others who take the discount or commission shall make
accounting strictly according to the facts.
67

AUCL, Article 8.
See Spencer S. Griffith & Yuanming Wang, Chinese Anti-Bribery Law: An Overview of the Chinese Laws
and Their Importance to Foreign Companies Doing Business in China—Part II, METRO. CORP. COUNS. (Aug.
30, 2010) , http://www.metrocorpcounsel.com/articles/12959/chinese-anti-bribery-law-overview-chinese-laws-andtheir-importance-foreign-companies.
69 PepsiCo under commercial bribery investigation, ENGLISH PEOPLE ’S DAILY ONLINE (Sept. 25, 2009)
http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90778/90857/90860/6767606.ht ml.
68
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At the time, the decision was heavily criticized by businesses and legal groups, making it
unclear whether actions like Pepsi’s would normally be prosecuted.70 Nonetheless, given the
current anti-bribery crackdown, the case may actually reflect present enforcement attitudes. If
nothing else, the Pepsi prosecution provides insight into the breadth with which the AUCL’s
commercial bribery provisions can be read.
Together, PRC Criminal Law and the AUCL create significant potential liability beyond the
scope of the FCPA. Another aspect of Chinese laws is broader than the FCPA as well.
2. Chinese Laws Contain No Exception for Facilitation Payments
The FCPA’s bribery provision makes an exception for facilitating or expediting payments
made in furtherance of “routine government action,”71 that involve non-discretionary acts.72
Examples include visa processing, supplying utilities, or providing mail service. 73 In contrast to
the FCPA, under Chinese laws, there are no exceptions for facilitation payments.
Companies should be informed regarding the difference between U.S. and Chinese laws, but
it is unlikely that companies are relying on this FCPA exception in crafting their policies and
procedures. There are no examples of it being used as defense to a bribery charge under the
FCPA. Moreover, it would be unwise to allow employees to decide whether something is a
facilitation payment. Finally, in order to comply with the books and records requirement of the

Henry (Litong) Chen, Double Exposure to Legal Risk Under China’s Competition Laws: Comments upon the
Exclusive Sales Arrangements in China, BLOOMBERG LAW REPORT S
http://www.mwechinalaw.com/news/2010/DoubleExposure.pdf.
71 FCPA 15. U.S.C. §78dd-1(f)(3) (2010).
72 DOJ Guidance
73 FCPA 15. U.S.C. §78dd-3 (2010).
70
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FCPA, it would then have to be recorded in the company’s records, so then companies would
have a possible bribe recorded in their books.
Most companies have correctly adopted zero-tolerance approach to official bribery. The
companies that do still view the FCPA facilitation exception as a safe harbor, however, should be
aware that this would not be available as a legal defense under Chinese laws. Companies paying
what would be considered facilitation expenses under the FCPA could be committing official
bribery subject to serious penalties.74
The breadth of Chinese bribery laws naturally gives pause to all companies with a Chinese
presence. Corporations have an extra incentive to tackle bribery whether it falls within the
FCPA or outside the FCPA scope. But, alarmingly, there is the possibility that a primary method
of avoiding bribery, due diligence, might be threatened by Chinese laws on information sharing.
While these laws are not bribery laws, per se, they are intricately linked to a company’s ability to
assess and address bribery risks. Once again companies need to be aware of developments in
Chinese laws so that they can order their compliance efforts accordingly.
B. Chinese Information Rules May Threaten Corporate FCPA Due Diligence
Due diligence is a key pillar of anti-bribery compliance75 whether for retaining a new third
party, considering a joint venture partner, or evaluating a possible acquisition. For third parties,
the DOJ has articulated its expectations. Companies, the enforcement agency says, “should
understand the qualifications and associations of its third-party partners, including its business

74
75

Discussed infra, Part.II.C.
See generally, DOJ Guidelines.
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reputation, and relationship, if any, with foreign officials.”76 Investigation is also expected in
mergers and acquisitions.77 Thorough due diligence can detect bribery in an acquisition. This can
allow a company to walk away from potential successor liability arising from the acquisition.
Alternatively, the purchaser can continue with the acquisition, but account for the compliance
issues in the price.78 Either way, due diligence is crucial. In joint ventures79 information
gathering is key since potential partners could be considered government officials or be in
corrupt relationships with government officials that could put the foreign company in legal peril.
But as the need for corporate investigations has increased under the FCPA, China has been
tightening access to business information, creating a catch-22 for companies.
Two laws attempt to restrict access to this type of material. Passed in 2009, an amendment to
Article 253 of the Criminal Code bans certain industries from "selling or unlawfully transferring
personal information."80 Purchasing the information is also illegal. 81 The law carries a penalty of

76

DOJ Guidelines 60, 2012, http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/guide.pdf.
Id.
78 See, e.g., Simon Montlake, Cat Scammed: How A U.S. Company Blew Half A Billion Dollard in China,
Forbes (Feb. 13, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/s imonmontlake/2013/02/ 13/cat-scammed-how-a-u -scorporation-blew-half-a-billion-in-china/, (recounting Caterpillar’s disastrous takeover of Siwei, a Chinese company
after inadequate due diligence failed to detect large-scale fraud in the Siwei’s books). Anti-Corruption Due
Diligence in Cross-Border M&A, Jones Day Commentary (June 2012),
http://www.jonesday.com/files/Publication/c45698ac-f309-43b 1-bf0f7da7059297ed/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/6e28e59c-861f-4302-b 087-7f5667706153/AntiCorruption%20Due%20Diligence.pdf, (providing other examples of disastrous due diligence failures as well as an
example of Lockheed Martin walking away from an acquisition after the target failed to address bribery issues
discovered in Lockheed’s due diligence).
79 Capitalism confined, ECONOMIST (Sept. 3, 2011), http://www.economist.com/node/21528262.
80 PRC Criminal Law art. 253:
77

Where any staff member of a state organ or an entity in such a field as finance,
telecommunications, transportation, education or medical treatment, in violation of the state
provisions, sells or illegally provides personal information on citizens, which is obtained during
the organ’s or entity’s performance of duties or provision of services, to others shall, if the
circumstances are serious, be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment not more than three years or
criminal detention, and/or be fined.
81

Id. (Whoever illegally obtains the aforesaid information by stealing or any other means shall, if the
circumstances are serious, be punished under the preceding paragraph. Where any entity commits either of the
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up to three years in prison.82 In 2013, the government issued more regulations restricting the
flow of “personal information."83
These laws were ostensibly passed to limit identity theft or other scams. 84 Certainly, most
companies would welcome improvements in China’s information protection. And the actual
provision is similar to OECD guidelines85 and European Union privacy laws,86 but China is
different from other countries with strict privacy limitations. In China, there is very little in the
way of public records or transparency. Also many Chinese citizens have the same names so it is
difficult to confirm company ownership without identification numbers. In addition, China has a
far greater risk of corruption than many of other countries with strict privacy laws.87 Finally, in
addition to these laws’ stated purpose, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that they are geared
toward suppressing access to information about government officials that might embarrass the
Chinese Communist Party (CCP).88
Regardless of the purpose of the restrictions though, the rules have crucial implications for
corporate due diligence. At the very least, these laws will jeopardize the quality of companies’
risk assessments and their ability to combat bribery. At worst, these rules could render
impossible dual compliance with the FCPA and Chinese laws.

crimes as described in the preceding two paragraphs, it shall be fined, and the direct liable person in charge and
other directly liable persons shall be punished under the applicable paragraph.” ).
82 Id.
83 See http://www.sidley.com/New-Chinese-Rules-Significantly-Heighten-Personal-Data-ProtectionRequirements-02-27-2013/
84 Ana Swanson, China’s Chilling Crackdown on Due Diligence Companies, THE A T LANTIC (Oct. 23, 2013),
http://www.theatlantic.com/china/archive/2013/10/chinas -chilling-crackdown-on-due-diligence-companies/280787/.
85 See generally, OECD Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data,
updated 2013, http://www.oecd.org/sti/ieconomy/2013-oecd-privacy-guidelines.pdf
86 See, e.g., Protection of Personal Data, http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/index_en.htm
87 TI rankings, supra note 31.
88 See generally, Part.II.D.
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Typical due diligence material is limited or completely unavailable. Access to corporate
records about company structure or individual hukous is very restricted.89 Government Bureaus
have been sealing files that record a business’s owners.90 These are often the only way to
determine the true owners of an entity and “uncover suspicious relationships and transactions. ”91
As is often the case with Chinese laws, these sometimes- vague laws also lend themselves to
total lack of predictability. There has been a recent case defining personal information under
Article 253, but that does not mean that other courts will take that interpretation. The
unpredictability is heightened because similar types of information are still being sold.92
The possible conflict between FCPA due diligence and Chinese laws is visible in the arrest of
Peter Humphrey and Yu Yingzeng. The two are founders of ChinaWhys.93 The company’s
website describes its mission as “walking multinationals through the labyrinth of opportunity,
risk and unfamiliar cultural environment.”94 The website boasts that the group “specializes in
discreet risk mitigation solutions, consulting and investigation services to corporate clients in
matters of high sensitivity across Greater China and the Asia Pacific.”95 The two individuals had
reportedly been doing FCPA-related investigations on behalf of GSK when they were detained
by Chinese police.96 Police said that they had purchased private identification information. 97 A

89 Kathrin Hille, Peter Humphrey case shows effects of China’s tightened privacy laws , FINANCIAL TIMES
(Aug. 29, 2013) , http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/ea96e13e-105a-11e3-99e0-00144feabdc0.ht ml#axzz2zZZpR1g C.
90 James T. Areddy, Jeanne Whalen, and Laurie Burkitt, China Said to Be Holding British Fraud Investigator,
W ALL ST REET JOURNAL (July 21, 2013),
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887323829104578619061421848882 .
91 Swanson, supra note 84.
92 Id.
93 Jane Perlez, In China, the Dangers of Due Diligence, NEW YORK TIMES (Sept. 13, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/14/business/global/china-hems-in-private-sleuths-seekingfraud.html?pagewanted=2.
94 ChinaWhys Website, http://www.chinawhys.com/aboutus.htm.
95 Id.
96 Perlez, supra note 93.
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police investigator claimed ChinaWhys had bought and sold details about “personal registrations,
automobile and home ownership records, family member names and details of cross-border
travel.”98 While this seems like exactly the type of information that might help companies detect
bribery, obtaining the information was illegal under Article 253.
China has charged other business researchers with similar offenses. The government arrested
a Canadian man after he provided fodder for a negative report about a mining operation.99 In
2012, four executives of a Dun & Bradstreet China subsidiary were arrested, sentenced to two
years in jail, and fined between US 800 and US 3,200. 100
These restrictions raise the cost. Investigators might be leery of doing due diligence. Or they
may choose not to do it anymore. Either way, the information will be difficult to obtain and more
expensive. In May of 2013, just months before he was arrested, Peter Humphrey penned
Exploring the Impact of China’s Clampdown on Public Records.101 In that article, he lamented
the increasing difficulty of conducting adequate due diligence at a time when it is more
important than ever.102 Humphrey said, "[a]s an anti-fraud worker in China serving purely
corporate clients on corporate matters or in litigation support, I find this a very dark day for due
diligence and forensics work."103 The new limits on information collection may mean that more
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James T. Areddy, China Puts Corporate Sleuths on Notice, W ALL ST . J. (Aug.21, 2013),
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887323980604579026422735845320 .
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99 Perlez, supra note 93.
100 Kathy Chu, Dun & Bradstreet Fined, Four Sentenced in China, W ALL ST . J. (Jan. 9, 2013),
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companies find themselves in this catch-22 where they might be violating Chinese information
laws when they attempt to detect bribery risks in compliance with the FCPA.104 It is clear that
this will continue to be something which companies will have to continue to monitor lest they
run afoul of these broad laws.
C. Consequences of Violating Chinese Anti-Bribery Laws Can Be Significant
Sections A and B addressed ways that Chinese laws are broader than or potentially conflict
with the FCPA. Those sections focused on Articles 163 and Article 164, part of PRC Criminal
Law; Article 8 of the AUCL, dealing with commercial bribery; and Article 253 and other
information access rules that can negatively impact FCPA bribery due diligence. This section,
Section C, casts a wider net, looking at the possible consequences for international companies for
violating any of the Chinese laws relating to bribery. This includes then, laws that overlap with
the FCPA in their prohibition on bribery of officials.105
Until recently, most of the focus Chinese laws had nothing to do with Chinese laws. Instead,
it was on the potential that Chinese investigations would trigger a parallel FCPA investigation.106
Investigations by one country often lead to investigations in other countries. Under UNCAC,
“[c]ountries agreed to cooperate with one another in every aspect of the fight against corruption,
including prevention, investigation, and the prosecution of offenders.”107 Under the Convention,

104

Perlez, supra note 93.

105 Laws that generally overlap with the FCPA include art. 389, 390, and 393 (prohibiting giving bribes to PRC

officials), art. 391(prohibiting giving bribers to government organs and state-owned entities), art. 392 (prohibiting
the facilitation of bribes), and the 2011 amendment to art. 164 (prohibiting Chinese individuals or entities from
bribing foreign government officials or officials of public international organizations).
106 Chow, supra note 39.
107 United Nations Convention Against Corruption: Background of the United Nations Convention against
Corruption http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/
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countries are also supposed to “render specific forms of mutual legal assistance…”108 That
degree of cooperation may be largely aspirational, but parallel investigations are still likely since
U.S. investigators follow Chinese law enforcement actions very closely.
It is already well-established that FCPA investigations are significant, but the incessant focus
on parallel investigations might lead to the perception that there are no meaningful consequences
for Chinese laws themselves. That is not the case. Chinese penalties can be severe. The fines
may not be as large as those under the FCPA, but the consequences of violating or being
investigated for violating Chinese bribery laws can be dire for the individual and the entity.
1. Individuals are Likely to be Prosecuted
Under the FCPA, large corporate fines and costly investigations are widely considered the
most serious outcome. Though on the rise, FCPA actions against individuals have been rare. To
some, this has undermined the deterrent effect of the FCPA. Chinese law, on the other hand,
makes it difficult to charge entities, 109 making a focus on the individual more likely. For
example, in the GSK case, Chinese executives will likely be charged, while the company will
not.

110

Under Chinese laws, individuals can face a range of severe legal and extra legal

consequences.
Of the potential consequences, the most serious, albeit an unlikely one for foreign employees,
is the death penalty. The death penalty is a possibility in bribery cases. Though there is relatively
little information about China’s use of the death penalty, estimates are shockingly high at several
108

Id.
Adam Jourdan, GSK’s Chinese Executives, but not Company, likely to Face Charges in China: Sources, UK
REUT ERS (Nov. 4, 2013), http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/11/04/uk-gsk-china-idUKBRE9A307J20131104
(“quoting Daniel Chow: “ I don’t know of any previous case in which the Chinese government has laid criminal
charges against a foreign company.”).
110 Id.
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thousand a year.111 Despite the lack of transparency around it, it is clear that the government has
used the death penalty in many official bribery cases. In one case, an executive of China Mobile
was sentenced to death for accepting bribes from Seimans.112 Another official, Zheng Xiaoyu,
was executed after he took bribes in exchange for approving medicines, some dangerous, in his
role as head of the SFDA.

113

To be clear, there are no examples of employees of international companies being executed
for bribery. Any use would be greeted with outrage around the world and fear in the foreign
business community. While execution of corporate personnel is not likely, the fact that it is an
option should frighten international companies.
A less severe, but still very frightening prospect is the possibility of a prison sentence in
China. Prison sentences have been uncommon under FCPA enforcement. One former assistant
U.S. Attorney argued, “you throw a couple of executives in jail in the U.S.—that’s going to catch
people’s attention in a much more significant way than a $100 million fine.”114 If that is the case,
then Chinese laws should grab people’s attention in a significant way.
Under Chinese law, prison time is likely if the case is a serious one. If the bribery involves
“official bribery,” the individual could face a lifetime prison sentence.115 Individuals convicted
of giving commercial bribes could face up to ten years.116 Individuals who receive commercial

111

Margaret K. Lewis, Chapter 5: Legal Systems in China in THE ROUT LEDGE HANDBOOK OF CHINESE
CRIMINOLOGY 51, at 53 (Liqun Cao, et. al. eds., 2014).
112 Henry Chen, Pharma bribe probe points to China parallel prosecutions, THE FCPA BLOG (Thursday, July
11, 2013, 2:18 PM), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2013/7/11/pharma-bribe-probe-points-to-china-parallelprosecutions.html#sthash.OFXv6cz9.dpuf.
113 Hongming Cheng and David O. Friedrichs, Chapter 19:White-Collar and Corporate Crime in China in THE
ROUT LEDGE HANDBOOK OF CHINESE CRIMINOLOGY 238, at 242 (Liqun Cao, et. al. eds., 2014).
114 Melissa Maleske, The impact and continuing evolution of the FCPA, Inside Counsel (May 22, 2013),
http://www.insidecounsel.com/2013/05/22/the-impact-and-continuing-evolution-of-the-fcpa?page=2.
115 PRC Criminal Laws Articles 390, 391, 392, and 393.
116 PRC Criminal Law Article 164

Jackson--Page 23 of 43

bribes face up to fifteen years in prison.117 No employees of international companies want to be
in a Chinese jail. And yet, it has happened.118
Related to imprisonment, is the possibility of prolonged detention, possibly incommunicado.
Extended detention, without formal charges, is a reality in China because law enforcement can
legally hold people for long periods without making a formal arrest. 119 In many cases this means
they have no access to lawyers or consular officers.120 These types of restrictions have been used
widely by the Chinese government. The New York Times reported that Peter Humphrey and Yu
Yingzeng were held for a month without seeing friends and family.121 During the early days of
the GSK probe, more than 30 employees were placed under house arrest and subject to round the
clock surveillance.122
Any lengthy detention is a serious concern. But it carries with it an additional worry: the
potential for coerced testimonies. Like the U.S. law, Chinese criminal law allows for reduction in
sentence with “voluntary confession.”123 But mounting a defense under Chinese or other
countries’ laws could be difficult after confessing while in Chinese custody. After Peter
Humphrey was paraded on television, face blurred, in an orange jumpsuit, the British Embassy
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expressed its frustration that Humphrey was “publicly interviewed about the details of his case,
which is currently under investigation and has yet to come to trial.”124
China has a rich history of public apologies. During the Cultural Revolution, many Chinese
were subjected to self-criticisms.125 The practice has continued with the government with recent
self-criticism sessions.126 The importance of public confessions or apologies has been important
for foreign businesses and individuals as well. Four GSK senior executives gave full confessions
to “serious economic crimes” after their arrest.127 GSK’s head of emerging markets, also
expressed regret for the crimes committed by GSK China employees.128 One commentator refers
to the corporate “art of the ChinApology,”129 humorously addressing the difficulty navigating the
major Western laws and the Chinese expectations.
Oddly, the least severe prospect of Chinese legal penalties is the financial penalty for
individuals. Fines and confiscation of property, are much lower than U.S. fines. For official
bribery or that involving commercial bribery, there is no predetermined amount. Penalties for a
non-criminal offense of commercial bribery range between RMB 10,000 and RMB 200,000.
Still, most employees would prefer to avoid financial fines.
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2. Corporate Entities Can also Suffer Serious Consequences
As the section above indicated, charges against entities are relatively rare. When they are
assigned, fines have been low by FCPA standards. Still, there are many ways that a Chinese
violation or investigation can negatively impact a company’s operations.
One extreme possibility is for the government to revoke the company’s business license.130
This would probably only be possible in the event of significant popular outrage at a product that
killed or seriously injured someone.
A more likely consequence of a bribery investigation is negative regulatory attention. This
can lead to a failure to renew an important regulatory license. For example, in China, the Chinese
Food and Drug Administration (CFDA) must renew license every five years. Failure to renew a
license on a major drug product could be devastating to a company’s financial outlook.
Increased regulatory attention can also lead to other violations being discovered. For
example, while the GSK investigation started with a bribery inquiry, it quickly turned to
accusations about price-fixing.131 Other records violations may come to light. The relationship
between various types of government scrutiny is illustrated by the fact that the 2009 Pepsi
investigation for commercial bribery violations followed closely on the heels of a yeast
contamination issue in its frozen orange juice. 132
Another significant effect of a bribery investigation is a drop in sales. Under the FCPA,
companies talk about reputation damage, but it seems unlikely that U.S. consumers will stop
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shopping at Wal-Mart because it engaged in bribery in Mexico. It might be more likely in China
where China Central Television frequently makes inflammatory appeals to anti-foreigner
sentiment.
Even more likely, business associates might avoid doing business with the company out of
fear of getting snared in the probe. This could apply to consumers, middle- men, suppliers, and
consultants. This was evident after the GSK probe when sales of GSK vaccines and other
medicines declined after doctors refused to meet with GSK’s sales reps. They were afraid of
being associated with the probe.133 Sales also dropped after Chinese media accused French
company, Danone SA of paying bribes to medical staff in return for pushing their formula for
new mothers.134
Companies with recognizable brand names and key competitors may find themselves
especially vulnerable to a decline in customer demand, either through an organized boycott or as
an effect of third parties avoiding the company representatives and products. This can happen in
after an FCPA investigation too, but the relationship between the domestic climate in China
means that it will have a greater impact in China
A few months after the investigation began, GSK’s sales had dropped by 61%.135 The
company’s CEO noted that their China numbers had suffered most where other options were

133 Adam Jourdan, Kaznouri Takada, & Ben Hirschler, Analysis Bribery Scandal dents Big Pharma sales in
China, GSK hardest Hit.,
134 Adam Jourdan, China Milk Powder Crackdown is Tough Medicine for Doctors, Sales Reps, UK REUT ERS
(Oct. 15, 2013), http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/10/15/uk-ch ina-milkpowder-id UKBRE99E0ZS20131015.
135 Kitamura Makiko, Glaxo’s China Sales Plunge 61% after Corruption Probe, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Oct. 23,
2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-10-23/glaxo-s-china-sales-plunge-61-after-corruption-probe.html.
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available.136 For instance, GSK sales slumped on one key drug with AstraZeneca, a competitor,
offering an alternative option.137
Disruptions in marketing and sales, management can also result. GSK has had to change its
sales model rapidly138 and fire hundreds of people.139 This will have important ramifications for
GSK in China in coming years. Danon SA was under pressure to make changes in its marketing
techniques as well.140 These noteworthy consequences for both individuals and entities should
worry international companies—especially in light of the trend toward greater enforcement of
Chinese laws.
D. International Companies Should Expect More Enforcement
Considering Section C, it is clear that the consequences of violating Chinese laws can be
dire. But these laws and these penalties have been on the books for years; they were just
unenforced. These bribery laws are merely in the news now because of a recent uptick in
enforcement efforts.
This is not the first time China has promised to crack down on bribery. In the past, China has
engaged in significant anti-corruption campaigns. Leaders under Mao were concerned with
corruption, launching various campaigns against it. 141 In 1986, the government popularized the

Ben Hirschler, Update 2-Bribery Scandal Slashes Glaxo Smith Kline’s Chinese Drug Sales, Reuters
(October 23, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/10/23/gsk-earnings-idUSL5N0ID2J520131023.
137 Id.
138 Jonathan D. Rockoff and Hester Plumridge, Drug Firms Curb Ties to Doctors, W ALL ST . J. (Dec. 17, 2013),
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304858104579263640414302348 .
139 Naomi Kresge, Glaxo Said to Fire Workers, Withhold Bonuses in China , BLOOMBERG NEWS (Apr. 4, 2014)
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-04-04/glaxo-said-to-fire-wo rkers-withhold-bonuses-in-china.html.
140 Adam Jourdan, China Milk Powder Crackdown is Tough Medicine for Doctors, Sales Reps, UK REUT ERS
(Oct. 15, 2013), http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/10/15/uk-ch ina-milkpowder-id UKBRE99E0ZS20131015.
141 KENNET H LIEBERT HAL , GOVERNING CHINA: FROM REVOLUT ION THROUGH REFORM 180 (1995).
136
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slogan “[b]eat the tiger [of corruption] in the year of the tiger.”142 And in 1989, preceding the
Tiananmen Square event, corruption was a key complaint. 143 As with now, leaders claimed that
the very legitimacy of the CCP was at stake in the corruption issue. 144 Clearly those campaigns
were short-lived.
Under Xi’s leadership, China made some high profile moves to enforce its bribery laws
against foreign companies in China. The question for international companies then is whether
they can expect this recent enforcement to continue. It is impossible to predict exactly what
China will do. But this paper argues that there are many reasons that the Chinese government
will continue to focus on international companies. At its core, the government has to do
something about corruption and international companies are the most convenient targets.
1. China Needs to do Something About Corruption
Any discussion about China’s domestic political environment begins with a discussion of
legitimacy. It is mentioned so frequently it seems cliché, but the legitimacy, or the lack thereof,
helps frame the enforcement environment around bribery. In short, endemic corruption imperils
the existence of the CCP. It undermines good governance. It angers Chinese citizens.
In the past, the CCP was able to maintain tight control over the information about public
officials. That has changed with the internet and social media. The past several years have seen
other governments topple when angry citizens use social media to organize themselves. In that
same time, numerous reports have surfaced pointing to grotesque levels of corruption within the
CCP. One report, intended for internal investigation, revealed staggering corruption over a
142 JUNE TEUFEL DREYER, CHINA’S POLIT ICAL SYST EM: M ODERNIZATION AND TRADITION 125 (Stephen Hull
ed., 2d ed., 1996)
143 Id. at 155
144 KENNET H LIEBERT HAL , GOVERNING CHINA: FROM REVOLUT ION THROUGH REFORM 269 (1995).
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fifteen year period where over ten thousand Chinese officials embezzled or otherwise illegally
obtained USD 120 billion and fled the county. 145 Another news story exposed then-Premier Wen
Jiabao’s wealth.146 Several news stories shined a light on the wealth amassed by Xi Jinping’s
family as well.147
Then came the Bo Xi Lai trial. A Congressional Research Service (CRS) report notes of the trial,
“[a]s details of the Bo family’s wealth emerged, it also highlighted the degree to which the
families of top Party officials have been able to parlay access to political power into vast
personal wealth, information that risks further harming the Party’s already fragile legitimacy.”148
The CRS also said, “with the role micro-bloggers played in moving events in the Bo saga
forward, the Bo affair highlighted the challenge the Communist Party faces in controlling
information and narratives in a social media age.”
In the wake of these scandals, Chinese citizens flocked to social media to express their
outrage, speak about their own experiences, or reveal corrupt officials. There was a slew of
sometimes sordid exposes on lower-level Chinese officials, some involving mistresses with
Hermes Birkin Bags, inconceivable on a clean-government-bureaucrat budget.149 Xinhua reports
that 15% of 2013’s whistleblowers were scorned mistresses of corrupt officials. Reporting

145

Leo Lewis, Mistakenly-Released Report Reveals Embarrassing Extent of Chinese Corruption , THE
A UST RALIAN, (June 17, 2011), http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/world/accidentally-released-report-revealsembarrassing-extent-of-chinese-corruption/story-e6frg6so-1226076938605.
146 David Barboza, Billions in Hidden Riches for Family of Chinese Leader, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 25, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/26/business/global/family-of-wen-jiabao-holds-a-hidden-fortune-inchina.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
147 Michael Forsythe, Shai Oster, Natasha Khan, & Dune Lawrence, Xi Jinping Millionaire Relations Reveal
Fortunes of Elite, BLOOMBERG (June 29, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-06-29/ xi-jinpingmillionaire-relations-reveal-fortunes-of-elite.ht ml.
148 LAWRENCE & M ART IN, supra note 154, at 18.
149 See, e.g., Martin Patience, China’s Scorned Mistresses Take Revenge on ‘Corrupt Lovers,’ BBC (Oct. 9,
2013); see also, Jia Lynn Yang, Ji Ying and Other Jilted Mistresses Expose Chinese Officials’ Corruption , W ASH.
POST (July, 25, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/ji-yingnan-and-other-jilted-mistresses-exposechinese-officials-corruption/2013/07/25/8d8d 35f6-eb02-11e2-aa9f-c03a72e2d 342_story.html.
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corruption is not just for scorned mistresses. It can come from employees, business associates,
competitors, or political rivals.150 Competitors might “blow the whistle” not out of moral
outrage, but in an effort to gain a competitive edge. 151 Or, an angry official might attempt to get
retribution by investigating the company. Regardless of how or why the information gets into the
public arena, the government is under tremendous pressure to take action.
President Xi Jinping and many other top officials recognize the danger to CCP rule posed by
corruption. Xi has spoken relatedly about it. In one speech, he singled out graft and corruption
as “pressing problems” that needed to be resolved “urgently.”152 In an address to the Politburo,
he warned, “a mass of facts tells us that if corruption becomes increasingly serious, it will
inevitably doom the party and the state.”153 Speaking to the Central Committee in 2012, he
echoed this cautionary statement again saying, “facts have shown that if corruption becomes
increasingly severe, it will ultimately lead to the ruin of the Party and the country.”154
President Xi has presided over the most significant anti-corruption drive in recent history,
referred to as “[d]rastic medicine.”155 At the time of writing this paper, there is actually timeline
on the government’s official website for China’s anti-corruption drive.156 When this latest

150

See Chow, supra note , at 1019, 1031-1032.
Id.
152 Xi Jinping, Pres. of China, Nov. 15, 2013, http://www.cnn.com/2012/11/15/wo rld/asia/china-xi-jinpingspeech/, (“There are many pressing problems within the Party that needs to be resolved urgently, especially the graft
and corruption cases that occurred to some of the Party members and cadres, being out of touch from the general
public, bureaucracy and undue emphasis on formalities -- they must be resolved with great efforts. The whole Party
must be vigilant against them.”).
153 Edward Wong, New Communist Party Chief in china Denounces Corruption in Speech, N.Y. TIMES (Nov.
19, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/20/world/asia/new-co mmunist-party-chief-in-china-denouncescorruption.html?_r=0.
154 Xi Jinping’s Speech at the First Collective Study Session of the 18 th Chinese Communist Party Political Bureau,
http://www.cecc.gov/publications/commission-analysis/combating-corruption-in-china-advances-and-problems-andsuppression
155 Sui-Lee Wee, China’s Xi Warns of Grim fight against Corruption, Reuters (January 14, 2014),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/01/ 14/us -china-corruption-id USBREA0D0PN20140114.
156 Timeline: China’s anti-corruption drive, http://www.china.org.cn/china/2014-01/26/content_31311325.ht m.
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crackdown began, some China-watchers argued that the fight on corruption would be a short
one.157 But the numbers actually support a meaningful increase in corruption efforts,158
convincing some of the same skeptics.159
There is the typical talk about limiting banqueting and banning the distribution of extra
toiletries.160 But there have also been more high-level corruption charges than any other period
since the CCP came to power. Unlike previous campaigns, the government has been more likely
to prosecute senior executives of SOEs as well as mid to high-level officials and business people.
In fact, Zhou Yongkang is the most powerful Chinese official to be prosecuted during CCP
rule.161
Domestic legitimacy is not the only thing at stake. There are also international motivations
for China to continue to crackdown of bribery, official and commercial. Tackling corruption is
part of China’s obligations under numerous treaties and agreements. China acceded to the
UNCAC in 2005. China is a member of the World Trade Organization, an organization that

157 See, e.g., Andrew Wedeman, Dept. Political Science, GA. St. U., Testimony for the Congressional-Executive
Commission on China Roundtable, Corruption in China Today: Consequences for Governance, Human Rights, and
Commercial Rule of Law: Xi Jinping’s Anti-Corruption Campaign and the Third Plenum (Nov. 21, 2013),
http://www.cecc.gov/sites/chinacommission.house.gov/files/CECC%20Roundtable%20%20Corruption%20in%20Ch ina%20-%20Andrew%20Wedeman%20Written%20Statement.pdf, (“The lack of
attention to corruption during the plenum likely signals Xi’s anti-corruption campaign has run its course and that it
will be allowed to quietly die down.”).
158 Sui-Lee Wee, China’s Xi Warns of Grim fight against Corruption, Reuters (January 14, 2014),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/01/ 14/us -china-corruption-id USBREA0D0PN20140114, (13.3 % increase in
people punished).
159 Though note, Andrew Hall Wederman, Xi Jinping’s Tiger Hunt, China Policy Institute Blog (Mar. 17, 2014),
https://blogs.nottingham.ac.uk/chinapolicyinstitute/2014/03/17/xi-jinpings-tiger-hunt/, (“Sixteen months on,
however, it appears that far from a smoke and mirrors attempt to create the impression of action, Xi Jinping’s anticorruption campaign may well be the most sustained and most intensive drive against corruption since the advent of
the reform era in the late 1970s.”).
160 Adam Rose, China tells officials training should not involve tourism, Reuters (Jan. 3, 2014)
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/01/ 03/us -china-tourism-id USBREA0209X20140103
161 Benjamin Kang Lim and Ben Blanchard, China questions officials linked to ex-strongman in graft probe,
Reuters (Jan. 17, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/01/17/us -china-politics-idUSBREA 0G09V20140117.

Jackson--Page 32 of 43

requires that China increase its transparency and anti-corruption efforts. Many other
memberships also require Chinese action against corruption.
But while the government does recognize the need for reform, it does not want to draw
unnecessary attention to official bribery. Prosecuting corrupt officials tends to highlight the
general corruption of the CCP. In order to continue to control the flow of information, China’s
government has waged simultaneous campaign against transparency advocates, and journalists,
and corporate investigators.162 Nowhere is this more apparent than in the conviction and jailing
of Xu Zhiyong. Xu had raised official ire by demanding that officials disclose their assets. The
conviction was based on disturbing the public order, but most believe Xu was targeted because
of his reform and transparency advocacy. 163
Journalists and other social media reporters have also been targeted. The New York Times
reporter who investigated Wen Jiabao was unable to get his visa renewed. 164 After a report by the
International Consortium of Investigative Journalists pointed to wealth of many Chinese elite’s
families and use of tax havens, censorship seemed obvious. "offshore" and "princeling" - the
term for the children of senior Chinese leaders - caused the page to go blank on Sina Weiba165
Responding to a spate of internet exposes, the government criminalized “rumors” on the
internet—this led to significant drop in corruption exposes. There have also been changes in the
law around gathering information reducing the information available about Chinese citizens,
162

See supra Part.II.B.
See. e.g., China Charges Activist Xu Zhiyong for Seeking Political Reform and Transparency . Freedom
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(Jan. 23, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/01/23/us-china-activist-idUSBREA0M0BJ20140123.
164 David Barboza, Billions in Hidden Riches for Family of Chinese Leader, N.Y. TIMES (October 26, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/26/business/global/family-of-wen-jiabao-holds-a-hidden-fortune-inchina.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
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corporations, and officials.166 Many perceive them as being intended to stop investigations of the
sort above.167
Too much prosecution of official corruption threatens the stability of the party as
well. It could paralyze the government, take down too many leaders, or reveal to citizens
just how corrupt the government really is. Powerful ex-leaders Hu Jintao and Jiang
Zemin reportedly indicated that Xi’s actions against CCP officials were going too far.168
The government has said, “[o]nly if there is social stability can reform and development
continue to proceed.”169 A little steady reform is good. Too much, and the system might
collapse. This fits with the CCP modes operandi.
While the Communist Party has shown little to no interest in reforms that might
threaten its rule, for most of the last 30 years it has been undertaking… [reforms]
…intended to improve China’s governance in ways that might help solidify the
Party’s hold on power. Recent efforts have focused on ways of increasing the
legitimacy of the political system by making it more competitive, transparent, and
participatory, without going so far as to cede the Party’s ultimate control over all
major decisions.170

Investigating domestic companies carries its own problems since they are often
well connected with officials. The Economist recently provided this law-enforcement
anecdote illustrating the relationship between domestic entities and the government:
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Official investigators pounced. But unable or unwilling to find and jail the actual
crooks, says an industry source, officials have instead been strong-arming
innocent shipping firms. These are now being squeezed to under-invoice future
shipments from Shenzhen, and to claim instead that goods are leaving from other
ports. Why? Because then the trade figures would show superiors in Beijing that
the local investigators had “solved” the problem of invoice-faking in Shenzhen.
When looking for easy targets to fulfil their quotas of corruption-bashing, local
officials may find it simpler to pick on foreign firms than on local ones that have
good connections with local or national politicians. 171
This is not to say that domestic firms haven’t been under scrutiny. In fact,
numerous SOEs and other private companies have faced bribery probes. 172 But there are
difficulties in tackling domestic companies’ bribery. Unlike targeting officials and
foreign

companies,

however,

investigating

international companies has a lot of

advantages and few downsides.
2. International Companies Make Excellent Targets
International companies do indeed engage in corruption. When they do they can easily
be caught in the prosecution of an official. For example, IBM and Hitachi were both implicated
as part of a case against a Vice Minister of the Chinese Ministry of Construction. But
prosecution of foreign companies is best when the corruption does not embarrass the
government. It is a way to crack down on bribery, looking tough on corruption, without
displaying the dirty laundry of party members. It also has many other advantages.
The anti-foreigner language is often very effective domestic tool. During the initial GSK
scandal, the state-owned media played on nationalist sentiments within China.173 Bribery
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172 See, e.g., Adam Jourdan, Kazunori Takada, & Ben Hirschler, Analysis: Bribery Scandal dents Big Pharma
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Jackson--Page 35 of 43

investigations have also proved a way to address populist demands and consumer dissatisfaction
with prices.174 A National Health and Family Planning Commission spokesman said, China will
“resolutely crack down” on commercial bribery in pharmaceuticals. Such action, he claimed,
raises drug costs and putting a burden on consumers. 175 Recently, the government has attacked
apple, Yum Brands, Walmart, and Volkswagen. 176 The Chinese government has launched probes
of foreign dairy companies in an effort to reduce the high cost of infant formula and additional
milk products.177 GSK promised to review GSK’s business model and lower drug prices in
China178
Many have also viewed it as part and parcel of China’s protectionist measures. After
tainted milk killed six infants, foreign companies captured almost 80% of the market share for
formula. It seemed that the bribery investigations were meant to benefit domestic competitors.
China also wants to use domestic prosecutions to affect international outcomes with Chinese
companies. One China-watcher commented, “[b]y flexing regulatory muscle at home [against
foreign companies], they're aiming to make sure their companies will be taken care of overseas."
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Chinese regulators want to prevent overseas court rulings and trade decisions that aren't in
China's favor, he said.179
Some scholars and commentators have argued persuasively that the recent corruption drive
will be ineffective without other legal and social reforms. 180 That is probably true. Others
skeptics claim that the recent crackdown on bribery is largely for show, 181 or driven by
political182 or protectionist motivations.183 Even if all those things are true, this paper argues that
those criticisms should not stop companies from making changes to account for Chinese laws.
Looking at Chinas domestic environment and the international environment, the Chinese
government has a lot of incentive to continue to go after foreign company corruption
III.

HOW COMPANIES SHOULD BE RESPONDING TO CHINESE LAWS

Some companies might decide that the hassles and potential costs of Chinese enforcement
are too great. For instance many companies said that one concern was that regulatory system was
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harder on foreign companies.184 Those corporations might decide that China, with slowing
growth, is not worth it.185 But most companies, even those burned by investigations, 186 are
committed to doing business in China. China has the second largest economy in the world. 187 It
has one of the highest growth rates in the world at an enviable 7.6%. 188 It has the world’s largest
population.189 Many continue to see China is a key market of the future.190 Those many
international businesses who are committed to staying in China cannot continue with business as
usual.
These organizations need to pay more attention to the changing Chinese anti-bribery
landscape. Then they need to take steps to prevent or deal with possible problems. But even
those compliance officers who recognize the potential liabilities associated with Chinese laws
might be unsure of what more they should be doing. In contrast to the FCPA, there is a lot less
guidance, official or otherwise, to help companies comply with Chinese laws.
Commentators will continue to parse the GSK investigation and the current bribery climate,
offering analysis of China’s enforcement. Companies need to stay abreast of this information and

184 Richard Silk, U.S. Companies Fret Over China’s Economy, W ALL ST . J. (Mar. 19, 2014),
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185 See, e.g., Kathy Chu, In China, Western Companies Cut Jobs as Growth Ebbs Recruiting and Consulting
Firms Feel squeeze from Pullbacks, W ALL ST . J. (Dec. 12, 2013),
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303330204579249772516121850.
186 GlaxoSmithKline sales plunge in China after scandal, BBC (Oct. 23, 2013),
http://www.bbc.com/news/business -24637195, (quoting GSK chief executive claiming “there was ‘absolutely no
question’ of the company pulling out of China”); see also, GSK has too much at stake to exit China , Telegraph
(Oct. 23, 2013), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/pharmaceuticalsandchemicals/10400477/ GSK has-too-much-at-stake-to-exit-China.html, (agreeing that it is unlikely that GSK leaves China becaus e of GSK’s
significant investment in the country as well as the future potential in the Chinese pharmaceutical market).
187 The World Bank website, http://data.worldbank.org/.
188 The World Factbook, Central Intelligence Agency, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-worldfactbook/rankorder/2003rank.html?countryname=China&countrycode=ch&region Code=eas&rank=13#ch.
189 U.S. Department of Commerce, U.S. and World Population Clock, http://www.census.gov/popclock/.
190 See, e.g., Andrew Ward, GlaxoSmithKline sticks with bet on emerging markets, FINANCIAL TIMES (Feb. 5,
2014), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/0846f824-8e53-11e3-98c6-00144feab7de.html#axzz30DI0q xRL, (noting that
GSK has looked to emerging markets like China’s to make up for ebbing sales in other major developed markets).

Jackson--Page 38 of 43

make necessary changes. But considering the possible consequences of violations,191 there are
several steps companies should be taking now. Section A will discuss the obvious ways
companies should adapt to comply with Chinese law. Section B offers some suggestions of steps
companies should take to prepare for a bribery-law violation in China.
A. Complying with Chinese Laws
First, Companies need to adjust policies and procedures to reflect the areas where Chinese
laws are broader than the FCPA.192 This means the company needs to prohibit all bribery—not
just bribery of officials.
Companies should revamp their international policies to explicitly forbid commercial
bribery. Considering the trend toward addressing commercial bribery, it makes sense for
companies to make this change worldwide. 193 At the very least, however, address it in China
through a China-specific procedure. After prohibiting commercial bribery, companies need to
draw attention to the prohibition since current procedures might technically prohibit it, but not be
targeted prevent it. Training materials should then offer clear definitions and examples of
prohibited commercial bribery. Employees need to accurately record expenses related to private
entities and official. Then the company needs to explain the severe possible consequences
employees that engage in bribery in China—both within the company and without. Companies
also need to reinforce the total ban on facilitation payments as well.194
Both these changes need to be communicated to third party suppliers and consultants. Those
third parties should be trained as well. Contracts should contain clear language prohibiting
191
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bribery of any entities, official or private.195 As usual, the contract should also include language
allowing the company to audit the third party records if needed and warning the third party that
the contract will be terminated if bribery violations occur.
Then companies need to audit well. Internal and external controls should be geared toward
detecting all kinds of bribery, not just official bribery. Regardless of why they were retained,
companies need to then evaluate interactions with similar scrutiny.
Second, companies need to follow will be China’s laws and practices regarding information
access. Due diligence remains imperative under both the FCPA and Chinese laws. But as
Part II.B tells us, risk assessments for future employees, third party suppliers and consultants,
and potential partners might get companies and their information providers into trouble as well.
This will mean companies will need to walk a fine line, continuing to emulate best practices
while carefully complying with Chinese laws. They will need to insure that the entities doing the
investigations are not subjecting the company to risk.
More generally, companies need to take the same kind of action they are supposed to be
taking under the FCPA, but they need to do it better than they have been in China. It is always
important to valuate country-, industry-, and company-specific risks. This includes tailored
oversight of Chinese operations.

Companies need to keep abreast of common schemes and audit

for them. GSK apparently failed to detect the large sums being funneled illicitly to doctors
through travel agencies. Some have questioned why Price Waterhouse Cooper, GSK’s external

195 See note 36, supra, (discussing third parties) See Stephen Clayton, Top Ten Basic of Feign Corrupt Practices
Act Compliance for the Small Legal Department, Association of Corporate Counsel,
http://www.acc.com/legalresources/publications/topten/SLD-FCPA-Compliance.cfm.
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auditor did not detect the travel agency scheme. 196 Travel agencies have been a common conduit
for bribes; it has been used before at IMB in China.197 Chinese counsel can help evaluate what
types of things internal and external audit should be examining.
On that note, companies may consider a change in sales and marketing programs.
Commentators often credit sales pressures credited incentive for sales personnel to bribe.198
Recognizing this, GSK announced that it would no longer tie employee compensation to the
number of prescriptions doctors write. 199 In December of 2013 GSK announced that it would
stop paying doctors commissions to prescribe drugs. 200 They are also getting rid of prescriptions
targets for marketing, presumably to reduce incentive for corruption. 201 Though they denied that
it was related to the Chinese bribery investigation, 202 the connection seems clear.
Organizations should also consider changing marketing and communication strategies as
well. Continuing medical education (CME), for example, provides ample opportunity for
corruption or the appearance of corruption. Companies might want to adopt some of their strict
rules around CMEs in the United States. 203 Infant formula firms are doing the same things after

196 Ben Hirschler, How GlaxoSmithKline missed red flags in China, Reuters (July, 19, 2013),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/07/ 19/us -gsk-china-redflags-idUSBRE96I0L420130719, (quoting former PwC
partner saying “[t]ravel agencies are used like ATMs in China to distribute out illegal payments. Any company that
does not have their internal audit department all over travel agency spending is negligent.”).
197 See, e.g., Joe Palazzolo, IBM Pays $10 Million Over Alleged Bribes in China, S Korea, W ALL ST . J. BLOGS
(Mar. 18, 2011, 2:01 PM EST), http://blogs.wsj.com/corruption-currents/2011/03/18/ibm-pays-10-million-overalleged-bribes-in-china-korea/.
198 See, e.g., Benjamin Shobert and Damjan DeNobel, Compliance After China’s Healthcare Bribery Scandals,
CHINA BUS. REV. (Oct. 10, 2013), http://www.chinabusinessreview.com/compliance-after-chinas-healthcarebribery-scandals/, (“…much of the questionable behavior that the GSK scandal has exposed is a symptom of sales
organizations under extreme strain to generate sales.”).
199 Glaxo Smith Kine Website, http://www.gsk-china.com/asp/News/client/newconten/12182013124946.ht m.
200 Adam Jourdan, China Arrests Former Shanghai Health Deputy. UK Reuters (December 19, 2013),
http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/12/19/uk-china-co rruption-idUKBRE9BI0BF20131219.
201 Id.
202 Id. (“company said the measures were not directly related to its Chinese problems and were rather part of a
broad effort to improve transparency.”).
203 Hirschler, How GlaxoSmithKline missed red flags in China, (“In the United States and western Europe, such
CME funding for doctors is now tightly controlled. But there is little oversight in emerging markets.”).
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their marketing practices came under scrutiny. 204 Other companies are taking note. A quarter of
U.S. companies surveyed in recent American Chamber of Commerce survey said that they had
made changes to business practices or incentives as a result of the GSK scandal. 205 The best
companies work to ensure that compliance violations do not occur, but they also plan for a
problem.
B. Preparing for Chinese Enforcement
GSK had a program had more compliance officers in China than any other country except the
U.S.206 They did twenty audits per year in china. 207 And they did an extensive investigation
earlier in the year.208 Corporations need a contingency plan. This should be the case in Chinese
operations.
Companies and their Chinese-based employees need to know what to do in the event of an
investigation. They need to plan for Chinese authorities to conduct investigations and raids. 209
Under the FCPA, companies are encouraged to self-report. Chinese laws apparently encourage
voluntary disclosure and confession. 210 There is vigorous debate about the kind of circumstances
in which companies should self-report to the DOJ. A company facing a potential issue would
have to consider whether they would go to Chinese authorities with a confession.

204

Jourdan, China Milk Powder Crackdown is Tough Medicine for Doctor.
China Business Report 2013-2014, American Chamber of Commerce in Shanghai, http://www.amchamshanghai.org/ftpuploadfiles/Website/CBR/2013-2014-China-Business-Report.pdf.
206 Hirschler, How GlaxoSmithKline missed red flags in China.
207 Id.
208 Id.
209 For a list of suggestions of how to handle raids by Chinese law enforcement, see Dan Harris, How to Handle
a Chinese Government Raid. Very Carefully. CHINA LAW BLOG (Sep. 16, 2013),
http://www.chinalawblog.com/2013/09/how-to-handle-a-chinese-government-raid-very-carefully.html.
210 Interpretations on Several Issues Concerning Application of Law for Handling Criminal Cases of Bribe
Offering (Promulgated by Sup. People’s Ct. & Sup. People’s Procuratorate, Dec. 31, 2012 effective Jan. 1, 2013)
art. 12 (China) .
205
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Finally, international companies need to plan for their employees’ safety and well-being.211
The possibility of length detentions and forced confessions mean that companies need to have
safeguards to protect executives and other workers that might be targeted in an investigation. The
increased focus on and enforcement of Chinese laws should make companies wary of continuing
to be driven solely by FCPA concerns.
IV. CONCLUSION
International companies will continue to be drawn to China. While many companies
recognize that Chinese operations are at risk for bribery, they still focus on FCPA-related
concerns. Though the FCPA will continue to be a source of anxiety, responsible corporate
officers are remiss if they are not paying close attention and making changes when necessary, to
account for developments around Chinese laws. FCPA compliance is not enough. International
companies should be more concerned with China’s domestic anti-bribery laws—and not just
because they might trigger or impact parallel FCPA investigations.
Chinese bribery laws matter and international companies ignore those laws at their peril.
Every executive and compliance officer should know that Chinese laws are broader in certain
ways than the FCPA. Certain due diligence practices might conflict with some Chinese laws.
Penalties, particularly for individuals, are high. Enforcement is likely to continue. Companies
should take steps now to incorporate Chinese laws and enforcement into their own corporate
strategies. Chinese laws are growing up.

Appendix A: Compliance Gap Chart

211

See generally Part II.C.1.
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